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Drift is to evolution as inertia is to Newtonian mechanics. Both are the "natural" or default states of the systems to which they apply. Both are governed by zero-force laws. The zero-force law in biology is stated here for the first time.
The Newtonian analogy to evolutionary theory is fairly common in presentations of population genetics, especially in reference to the HardyWeinberg Law. Recent literature in the philosophy of biology has both criticized (Walsh et al. 2002 and Matthen and 
4
Newton expressed the 1 st Law in two parts, since he thought there was an absolute difference between objects at rest and objects moving at a constant velocity. Of course relativity theory rejects this distinction and therefore we often see simpler one-clause statements of the principle. But for our purposes, the Newtonian version is best. It states that:
1.
An object at rest will stay at rest unless acted on by a net external force.
2. An object in motion with a velocity v will remain in motion with velocity v unless acted on by a net external force. Or to put the point in more Aristotelian terms, Newton fundamentally altered the conception of what constituted "natural" motion.
All this is familiar. But let us now turn our attention to Newtonian explanations of inertial motion. Suppose an object is at rest at time t. Over the time interval t-t' it remains at rest. How do we explain this behavior? The acceleration, a, during this time interval is 0. Applying Newton's 2 nd Law, F = ma, we see that F = 0. Thus, according the 1 st Law the object remains at rest. This is elementary physics. We will see if it is elementary philosophy.
What sort of explanation is this? If one adopts some version of the covering-law model of explanation, it is paradigmatic. According to that model (see e.g., Hempel 1965) to explain a phenomenon is to subsume it under some one or more general laws.
That is exactly what we did above. But if one considers this model of explanation to be inadequate (Salmon 1971 (Salmon , 1984 , as I do, then how do we think about this explanation? That, not surprisingly, depends on the alternative model one adopts. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to argue for one theory of explanation over others. But elsewhere (Brandon 1990 ) I have argued for a causal-mechanical model of explanation in evolutionary biology (inspired by Salmon 1984) . Since our ultimate concern is with evolutionary biology, let us ask the question of how that model treats the above bit of Newtonian physics.
If one thinks of Newtonian forces as Newtonian causes-and that certainly seems reasonable-then one might think that the explanation of inertial phenomena is non-causal. Our explanation above did not cite a force; therefore it did not cite a cause. Rather it cited the absence of causes. So how can it be a causal explanation? One response to this question seems so unattractive that I will simply mention it without laboring to refute it. One might say that Salmon (1984) argues that the goal of explanatory science is to uncover the causal structure of the world. The Principle of Inertia (or rather its Relativistic counterpart) seems to be a fundamental part of the causal structure of our world. Because of that, I would consider our inertial explanation to be a perfectly good causal-mechanical explanation.
But, returning to the point made above, there is something different about this sort of Newtonian explanation vs. one that explains some non-inertial phenomenon in terms of some net force acting on the object. The latter sort of phenomenon requires "special" explanations. That is the lesson of Newton's 1 st Law. Thus we could mark this distinction by saying that non-inertial phenomena require "special-causal-explanations", while inertial phenomena require what I will call "default-causal-explanations".
In Newtonian mechanics, the Principle of Inertia clearly delimits what can, and cannot, be explained by default explanations. That is, it delimits the class of objects that fall under the zero-force law. We will see if there is any analogous law in biology.
THE HARDY-WEINBERG LAW AS A ZERO-FORCE LAW 7
The existence of a zero-force law presumes the existence of forces. Are there forces of evolution? Endler (1986) argued that the analogy to Newtonian physics was more misleading than helpful. More recently Walsh et al. (2002) and Matthen and Ariew (2002) have argued against the force analogy. I will not try to respond to these arguments in a point by point fashion; in part because I have offered detailed criticisms of the "emergentist statistical interpretation" of evolutionary theory defended in the two last mentioned papers (Brandon and Ramsey forthcoming), but also because I think a direct positive case can be made for considering certain evolutionary processes as forces.
Evolutionary Forces
The processes I have in mind are selection, mutation, migration, and nonrandom mating. In physics a force is a vector quantity. Selection presents a new challenge to the view that these evolutionary processes are forces. People tend to think of directional selection when they think of selection (this point will be explored and defended below). The other two patterns of selection are stabilizing and disruptive. These terms come from quantitative genetics so are usually defined in terms of phenotypic distributions.
Thus directional selection is when one extreme in the distribution is favored (e.g., the taller the fitter). Stabilizing selection is when a single point in the distribution is favored (e.g., 5m tall is the fittest). Disruptive selection occurs when 2 (or more) points in the distribution are favored (e.g., 2m tall and 6m tall are the fittest). But these terms have come to be used more generally and can translated into genetic terms. For instance in a two-allele model, if A1 is rare and A1A1 is fitter than A1A2, which is fitter than A2A2, then we would call that directional selection. But remember that a force is supposed to have a magnitude and a direction. This seems totally unproblematic for directional selection. But how about the other two forms? What is the direction of stabilizing selection? If a population, or some subpart of it, finds itself to the left of the selected point, then the direction of the force is to the right. But if the population is on the right of that point then the direction is to the left. Is our force analogy in trouble? No, or rather, only if it is problematic to think of gravity as a force. In our solar system two objects of equal mass and equal distance from the Sun, but on opposite sides of the Sun, will experience a force of equal magnitude but opposite direction.
That is exactly analogous to two subpopulations equidistant from the selected point in stabilizing selection but on opposite sides (assuming the selection gradient is the same on both sides). That gravitational force is relative to position is obvious in Newtonian mechanics. So that a similar relativity exists with respect to stabilizing and disruptive selection is not problematic.
Thus, although it has not been exactly straightforward, we have made a positive case for treating certain evolutionary processes as forces. Notice that drift has yet to be mentioned.
The Hardy-Weinberg Law
There are two importantly different ways of stating the H-W law. One statement of it lumps drift together with mutation, migration and the rest. The other does not. Here are the two versions:
H-W1: If a population exists with two alleles, A1 and A2, with frequencies p and q respectively, then in a single generation the population will settle into genic and genotypic equilibrium with gene frequencies p and q, and genotypic frequencies of A1A1 = p 2 ; A1A2 = 2pq; and A2A2 = q 2 -provided that there is no selection, mutation, migration, non-random mating, or drift.
H-W2:
If an infinite population exists with two alleles, A1 and A2, with frequencies p and q respectively, then in a single generation the population will settle into genic and genotypic equilibrium with gene frequencies p and q, and genotypic frequencies of A1A1 = p 2 ; A1A2 = 2pq; and A2A2 = q 2 -provided that there is no selection, mutation, migration, or non-random mating.
If H-W1 is to be considered a zero-force law then drift needs to be force just like the other evolutionary processes. However, I think that there are overwhelming reasons for not considering it a force.
Consider first the idea that a force has both a magnitude and direction.
Drift has a magnitude that can be probabilistically predicted prior to the fact, and can be quantitatively accessed after the fact (Brandon 2005) . But drift definitely does not have a direction. (That, of course, is why it is called drift.) Given a population consisting of two selectively neutral alleles, A1 and A2, at frequencies p = q = .5, we can predict that one of the two alleles will go to fixation (in the absence of evolutionary forces), but we cannot predict which will. That means drift has no direction. Stevens (2004) argues that drift does have a direction at the genotypic level. He suggests that it predictable leads to loss of heterozygosity and increase of homozygosity. That is a prediction, but a prediction without a direction. It doesn't say which of A1A1 or A2A2 will increase in frequency. In physics that would be like saying that a 20-Newton force is acting on object A. Such a statement either makes no sense (the magnitude, but not direction has been specified) or is incomplete (oops, I meant a 20-Newton downward force). Notice that we were able to specify the direction of the other evolutionary processes mentioned in H-W1.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, drift is not a "special" force in evolution; it is the default position. By that I mean that it is part and parcel of a constitutive process of any evolutionary system-namely, the sampling process.
Sampling takes place in a number of ways. I will not try to exhaustively name all of them, because I cannot, and I suspect no one can. That is, I suspect there are
as of yet undiscovered sampling processes going on in evolutionary systems.
But here is a partial list of sampling processes. Evolution requires reproducing entities that form lineages, parent-offspring lineages. So in many cases there is sampling of parents (not all potential parents actually reproduce). In sexual diploid organisms there is gametic sampling in the formation of a new diploid cell (fertilized zygote). There is also chromosomal sampling in the formation of 13 gametes. There is further sampling of parts of chromosomes in crossover events during meiosis. At the ecological level there is habitat sampling when organisms are dispersed over heterogeneous selective environments (Brandon 1990, chap 2). The process that leads to drift, sampling, is a necessary part of any evolutionary system. It is not some new process added to the basic evolutionary process. In contrast, mutation, migration and non-random mating are clearly separable processes, which may, or may not, be a part of some particular evolutionary scenario. Selection, like drift, depends on the sampling process. However, unlike drift, it has a direction and is separable from drift. Thus I think it is reasonable to treat selection as a "special" evolutionary force (on a par with mutation, etc.), while it is clearly unreasonable to think of drift that way. I will offer more support for this position shortly. That does not strictly imply the following: If no change then no force; but it does suggest it. It suggests that lack of change is a sign of lack of force. But in fact, the opposite is true: If no change then a set of forces must be acting. Again this truth is important in that it licenses the sorts of inferences biologists need to make in understanding equilibrium situations (more on this shortly).
Thus H-W2 is either: (a) A true zero-force law inapplicable to any real population; or (b) Applicable, but then equivalent to H-W1, and so not a zeroforce law; or (c) Applicable, but false.
And so the Hardy-Weinberg Law fails to be a zero-force law in evolutionary biology. Is there a zero-force law in evolutionary theory?
THE PRINCIPLE OF DRIFT AS A ZERO-FORCE LAW
The answer is "yes". But the law in question has heretofore been unstated. I will state it first, and then defend its truth, its usefulness, and its status as a zero-force law.
The Evolutionary Principle of Drift:
(A) A population at equilibrium will tend to drift from that equilibrium unless acted on by an evolutionary force.
(A population at rest will tend to start moving unless acted on by an external force.) (B) A population on evolutionary trajectory t will tend to depart from that trajectory (in either direction or magnitude or both) unless acted on by an evolutionary force.
(A population in motion will tend to stay in motion, but change its trajectory, unless acted on by an external force.) words, it is a principle of default evolutionary action. In the absence of evolutionary forces drift occurs, or, more precisely drift will tend to occur (see Fig. 1 
above). (Don't misunderstand this, drift can certainly occur in the presence
of evolutionary forces as well.) Drift is the default state of evolutionary systems.
We can explain evolutionary change due to drift. The drift producing potential of the sampling processes that are constitutive of the evolutionary process is a fundamental part of the causal structure of our world. Thus such explanations are causal but differ from evolutionary explanations that cite specific evolutionary forces. Just as in the Newtonian case, the first sort of explanation is a default-causal-explanation and the second a special-causalexplanation. It is the PD that enables us to make this distinction.
Is the PD true? I think its truth is patently obvious once one potential misunderstanding of it is removed. One might think that the PD takes a stand on an empirical issue, the truth of which is in doubt. That is, one might think that the PD is somehow committed to some particular claim about the relative importance of drift vs. selection. But this is a misunderstanding. Newton's 1 st
Law says nothing about the relative frequency of inertial objects vs. objects experiencing a net force in the universe. Indeed, think of the paradigm example of a system to which Newton's Laws apply-our solar system. All of the major objects in that system are experiencing constant acceleration due to gravitational forces. Likewise, the PD is perfectly compatible with the claim that selection and other evolutionary forces are the primary movers of the vast majority of populations.
Consider clause A. It says that in the absence of evolutionary forces (and in particular, selection) a population previously at equilibrium will start to drift.
The empirical debate over the relative importance of drift vs. selection is irrelevant to this claim. By hypothesis clause A removes selection. Then, by hypothesis, the existing variants are selectively neutral. From that it follows that drift will occur.
Consider clause B. It says that in the absence of evolutionary forces (and in particular, selection) a population previously moving in state space with trajectory t will depart from that trajectory. Again, the truth of this is fairly obvious. If the trajectory were due to one or more of the special evolutionary forces, then removing those forces would tend to change the trajectory. So although my point is not to criticize the H-W Law, it is clear that it is not fundamental, unlike the PD. Likewise, and perhaps more importantly, it doesn't provide appropriate null hypotheses in most cases. It suggests evolutionary stasis as a null hypothesis. But this is just wrong. In the absence of evolutionary forces drift occurs. So drift is the appropriate null hypothesis.
Finally, and relatedly, the H-W law is not a zero-force law. The PD is. It is in virtue of this fact that it does provide the appropriate null hypothesis.
CONSEQUENCES
Exactly how Evolutionary Theory relates to Newtonian mechanics may seem an esoteric topic in philosophy of biology. It is not. It has real consequences. I will divide those consequences into those more biological and those more purely philosophical.
Biological Consequences
Consider first the fundamental equation in quantitative genetics: R = h 2 S.
(Where R is the response to selection, h 2 the heritability of the traits under selection, and S the selection differential.) Technically this formula is true, but it can be misleading in that the technical meaning of R is much narrower than its non-technical meaning.
Quantitative genetics deals with traits, like height, that vary continuously, rather than discretely, and that are influenced by multiple genetic loci. The basic descriptive vocabulary of quantitative genetics includes the mean and variance of the distribution of some quantitative trait. R is defined as the difference between the means of the distributions of generation 1 and generation 2. But consider cases of stabilizing selection. Suppose we are dog breeders and have found a phenotypic value of some trait that we prize. Suppose further that this value is the mean value in the population, but that there is significant variance, σ 2 , about this mean. We strongly select for that value, letting only those at or very close to that value reproduce. What happens? Our expectation is that the mean will 22 remain unchanged but that the variance will decrease. This is a response to selection, i.e., the distribution of trait values has changed due to selection, but R = 0. Or consider birth weight in humans. It seems to be under stabilizing selection. Very small and very large babies have higher mortality rates than those with intermediate weights. Here too selection is having an effect. If birth weight did not matter for survival, then drift would affect the distribution, initially increasing σ 2 , and ultimately moving the mean. But again, misleadingly,
So what? Why not just conclude that the breeder's formula applies only to cases of directional selection and leave it at that. The reason I don't want to leave it there is that I think that a failure to apprehend the fundamentality of the Principle of Drift has affected our basic evolutionary concepts. Remember that the H-W Law leads to the view that evolutionary change = action of evolutionary forces. This in turn, I think, leads to an over emphasis on directional selection and an under appreciation of the necessity of the action of evolutionary forces for evolutionary stability. If the Principle of Drift is correct, and it certainly seems to be, drift is the natural state of evolutionary systems.
Thus, stability is a signal of strong evolutionary forces.
There are two potential misunderstands of evolutionary stability that I want to avoid. First, in population genetics there are at least three sorts of equilibria that usually recognized: stable equilibria, unstable equilibria and neutral equilibria. Hardy (1908) described the sort of neutral equilibrium that the H-W law applies to in the absence of evolutionary forces (R. C. Lewontin, pers. comm. 2005) . Hardy recognized that such equilibria are transient; indeed strictly speaking they should last only a singe generation (with drift changing gene frequencies each generation producing a new H-W "equilibrium"). Hardy used the work 'stable' to describe them, and wisely put that word in scare-quotes. It seems misleading to even describe this sort of situation as an equilibrium, but we will not pursue that here.
The distinction between unstable and stable equilibria will be familiar to most readers. In the first case perturbations from the equilibrium point lead to a dramatic departure from equilibrium (sometimes to a new equilibrium point, sometimes not), while in the second case there are forces that tend to restore the population to its original equilibrium point when it is perturbed. It is the latter that I am referring to in this paper when I speak of evolutionary stability.
Keeping the PD in mind helps make the distinction between stable and neutral equilibria straightforward. But if also suggests an important distinction among so-called stable equilibria. Brandon and Nijhout (submitted) explore this distinction in detail, arguing that genic selectionists systematically misdescribe equilibria actively maintained by selection as equilibria where selection is absent, but where departures from equilibrium generate (frequency-dependent) selection to restore equilibrium. For example, a genotypic model of overdominance has selection acting in a frequency-independent way, and so, at equilibrium the selection differentials between the heterozygote and the two homozygotes are as strong as they are anywhere else in state space. This is what we call an equilibrium actively maintained by selection. In contrast, the genic selectionist has no selection acting at equilibrium, and selection differentials increase (usually slowly) as the population is perturbed away from equilibrium.
We show that the evolutionary trajectories predicted by these two descriptions are not empirically equivalent. Although the focus in that paper is on the mistakes of genic selectionism, we show that the argument is quite general
The second potential misunderstanding of evolutionary stability that I wish to forestall is that it is analogous to a set of balanced forces in Newtonian mechanics. To see this is not the case one needs to remember what happens when a set of balanced forces is removed from a Newtonian system. For instance, if a magnet exerts a 10-Newton upward force on an object and gravity exerts a 10-Newton downward force on the object, the result in no net force and so no acceleration. If we remove both the magnetic force and the gravitational force, then the behavior of the object is exactly as it would have been in the presence of the balanced forces. In contrast, it is wrong to think that in a case of stabilizing selection the force of selection is balanced against mutation (or mutation and recombination in the case of multi-locus traits). We can see this by removing the evolutionary forces. When we do this the behavior of the system is not the same. Instead drift occurs. Again we see how evolutionary stability is not the result of zero net force, but rather the result of evolutionary forces counteracting the natural state of the system-drift.
The same point can be made by looking at the definition of evolution.
Population geneticists usually define evolution as change in gene frequencies over generational time. From the point of view discussed above (quantitative genetics) evolution is change in the mean of a phenotypic distribution over generational time. But we could broaden a purely phenotypic definition of evolution. We could say that evolution is change in the mean or variance (or some other statistical property) of a phenotypic distribution over generational time. Finally some who want to emphasize the importance of development in the evolutionary process may want to define evolution as change in developmental processes over generational time. It should be clear that these definitions are compatible with one another, and from our point of view their similarity to one another is more interesting than their differences. They all describe evolution in terms of change.
Of course, the term 'evolution' had a meaning before Darwin appropriated it for a more technical scientific usage. And its scientific meaning is deeply entrenched. So I am not going to suggest we fundamentally change its meaning. However its meaning does have strange consequences. In the cases of stabilizing selection discussed above evolutionary forces (primarily selection) are in action. They have a trans-generational effect, i.e., the phenotypic distribution is different than it would have been in the absence of selection. But, if the stabilizing selection has reached an equilibrium, no evolution is occurring. So we end up saying that in these cases evolutionary forces are having transgenerational (it is tempting here to say evolutionary) effects, but this is not evolution. That is odd.
(If I were to be sent on a mission to teach evolution to the gentle citizens of some distant planet, I would tell them that evolution is the trans-generational 26 transition in state-space of a population. The transition may take the population to exactly the same position in state space that it had in the previous generation, or it may take it to a different position. (2002) have argued that evolutionary biologists must measure fitness in terms of evolutionary change. But if one of the primary ways selection acts is in stabilizing selection, then these views are entirely wrong-headed. And in fact, biologists measure fitness in terms of evolutionary change only very rarely and only as a last resort (Endler 1986 , Kingsolver et al. 2001 Brandon and Ramsey forthcoming).
Philosophical Consequences
I used to think that biology had exactly one law-the Principle of Natural Selection (Brandon and Rosenberg 2003) . I now see it has two.
Perhaps more interesting than counting the number of fundamental laws in evolutionary theory is recognizing the thoroughly probabilistic nature of those laws. I have argued extensively elsewhere (e.g., Brandon 1978 Brandon , 1990 ) that the Principle of Natural Selection is an instantiation of (a specially structured
version of) what is called the Principle of Direct Inference in Probability Theory.
This is the principle that allows one to infer from probabilities to actual frequencies. In this paper we have seen how the Principle of Drift is purely the result of the finite sampling processes that are part and parcel of the evolutionary process. Thus, for those who are reductionistically minded (I am not), these two laws point to probability theory as the reductive foundation of evolution, not to physics or chemistry. But from a temporal point of view the Principle of Drift is new. Or at least relatively new; but as we saw above, Hardy (1908) talks about a drift phenomenon, without using that word. This is probably the first discussion of evolutionary drift, (Lewontin, pers. comm. 2005) . It would be an interesting historical project to see just how and when drift as the default state of evolutionary systems became embedded into evolutionary thinking. My point is that, unlike the Principle of Natural Selection, which one might reasonably trace back to Darwin, the Principle of Drift is relatively modern. It has been first named and articulated in this paper. However, contemporary evolutionary biologists regularly make the inferences it licenses. So I don't claim to have made a new biological discovery here. What I have done is to systematize these important inferences into a single law, a law that is fundamental to contemporary evolutionary biology.
BIOLOGY'S FIRST LAW

CONCLUSIONS
How similar is modern evolutionary theory to Newtonian mechanics?
Taken is isolation, that question is at best silly, at worst meaningless. Is the answer 17? Taken in the context of recent literature in the philosophy of biology we can say that it is not as similar to Newtonian mechanics as Stevens (2004) thinks, but much more so than either Walsh et al. (2002) or Matthen and Ariew 
